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作者：Bazley, William; Bonaparte, Yosef; Korniotis, George; Kumar, Alok
作者单位：University of Kansas; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver; University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus; Children's Hospital Colorado
摘要：This paper examines whether perceptions of discrimination affect the economic expectations of U.S. households. We focus on two forms of expectations that play a central role in economic and financial decisions of households: labor income and inflation. Using experimental data, we demonstrate that discrimination generates greater dispersion in household forecasts. It increases subjective expectations of income uncertainty by 8% and inflation uncertainty by 5%. The impact of discrimination is co...
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作者：Pathak, Parag A.; Soenmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College; Deakin University
摘要：A priority system has traditionally been the protocol of choice for the allocation of scarce life-saving resources during public health emergencies. COVID-19 revealed the limitations of this allocation rule. Many argue that priority systems abandon ethical values, such as equity, by discriminating against disadvantaged communities. We show that a restrictive feature of the traditional priority system largely drives these limitations. Following minimalist market design, an institution design pa...
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作者：Wang, Wenli; Cai, Gangshu (George)
作者单位：Taiyuan University of Science & Technology; Santa Clara University
摘要：Because of many firms' lack of collateral, banks have imposed loan limits as a form of risk-control regulations of bank financing. In response, loan insurance has emerged as a useful instrument to lift loan limits. To study the joint value of bank loans and loan insurance, this article investigates a supply chain composed of one supplier and one capital-constrained buyer who takes out a bank loan and potentially purchases loan insurance. The analysis reveals that both the supplier and the buye...
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作者：Moss, Austin; Naughton, James P.; Wang, Clare
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Virginia
摘要：Using an hourly data set on retail investor individual security positions from Robinhood Markets, we find no evidence that environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures inform retail investors' buy and sell decisions. The response on ESG press release days by retail investors is indistinguishable from nonevent days. In contrast, these same investors make economically meaningful changes to their portfolios in response to non-ESG press releases, especially those that pertain to earning...
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作者：Li, Zongxi; Reppen, A. Max; Sircar, Ronnie
作者单位：Princeton University; Boston University
摘要：We propose a mean field game model to study the question of how centralization of reward and computational power occur in Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. Miners compete against each other for mining rewards by increasing their computational power. This leads to a novel mean field game of jump intensity control, which we solve explicitly for miners maximizing exponential utility and handle numerically in the case of miners with power utilities. We show that the heterogeneity of their initial wea...
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作者：Okat, Deniz; Vasudevan, Ellapulli V.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad
摘要：We analyze banks' protected-weekend policies that restrict junior bankers from working during weekends. We use taxi rides from bank addresses in New York City to infer bankers' working hours. We find the policies induced bankers to shift their work to late-night hours on weekdays. We then investigate whether such shifts in working hours affected the quality of work. After the policy, analysts of the policy-implementing banks make more errors in their earnings forecasts. They also herd more tow...
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作者：Incekara-Hafalir, Elif; Lee, Grace H. Y.; Siah, Audrey K. L.; Xiao, Erte
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Monash University; Monash University Malaysia; Monash University
摘要：Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be ineffective due to the potential discouragement effect. In contrast, empowering individuals to choose between the two reward mechanisms can significantly improve the full completion rate. Data from a series of...
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作者：Thakor, Richard T.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Financing frictions may create a misallocation of assets in a market, thus depressing output, productivity, and asset values. This paper empirically explores how liquidity shocks generate a reallocation that diminishes this misallocation. Using a unique data set of agricultural outcomes, I explore how farmers respond to a relaxation of financial constraints through a liquidity shock unrelated to farming fundamentals, namely exogenous cash inflows caused by an expansion of hydraulic fracturing ...
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作者：Anunrojwong, Jerry; Iyer, Krishnamurthy; Manshadi, Vahideh
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Yale University
摘要：We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylizedmodelwith heterogeneous userswho differ in their private outside options: low-need users have an acceptable outside option to the social service, whereas high-need users have no viable outside ...
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作者：Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation building. Although some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms, such as reputation, generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability; people simply hide their lies better by sub...
