Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iyengar, Garud; Saleh, Fahad; Sethuraman, Jay; Wang, Wenjun
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Wake Forest University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3415-3436
• 关键词: permissioned blockchain; Blockchain Adoption; technology adoption; FinTech

摘要

We construct an economic framework for understanding the incentives of the participants of a permissioned blockchain for supply chains and other related industries. Our study aims to determine whether adoption of blockchain is socially beneficial and whether such adoption arises in equilibrium. We find that blockchain reduces information asymmetry for consumers, thereby enhancing consumer welfare. Consumer welfare gains can be suffi-ciently large that blockchain adoption is socially beneficial; nonetheless, we find that block chain adoption does not arise in equilibrium. This situation arises because blockchain adoption costs are borne by manufacturers, and manufacturers cannot extract consumer gains through prices due to the competitive nature of the manufacturing sector. We offer a system of transfers to generate blockchain adoption in equilibrium when it is socially beneficial.