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作者：Chao, Raul O.; Kavadias, Stylianos; Gaimon, Cheryl
作者单位：University of Virginia; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：The first step in transforming strategy from a hopeful statement about the future into an operational reality is to allocate resources to innovation and new product development (NPD) programs in a portfolio. Resource allocation and NPD portfolio decisions often span multiple levels of the organization's hierarchy, leading to questions about how much authority to bestow on managers and how to structure incentives for NPD. In this study, we explore how funding authority and incentives affect a m...
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作者：Huh, Woonghee Tim; Janakiraman, Ganesh; Muckstadt, John A.; Rusmevichientong, Paat
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University; Cornell University
摘要：We study a single-product single-location inventory system under periodic review, where excess demand is lost and the replenishment lead time is positive. The performance measure of interest is the long-run average holding cost and lost sales penalty cost. For a large class of demand distributions, we show that when the lost sales penalty becomes large compared to the holding cost, the relative difference between the cost of the optimal policy and the best order-up-to policy converges to zero....
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作者：Bhaskaran, Sreekumar R.; Krishnan, V.
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The growing sophistication of component technologies and the rising costs and uncertainties of developing and launching new products require firms to collaborate in the development of new products. However, the management of new product development that occurs jointly between firms presents a new set of challenges in sharing the costs and benefits of innovation. Although collaboration enables each firm to focus on what it does best, it also introduces new issues associated with the alignment o...
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作者：Cachon, Gerard P.; Swinney, Robert
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a retailer that sells a product with uncertain demand over a. finite selling season. The retailer sets an initial stocking quantity and, at some predetermined point in the season, optimally marks down remaining inventory. We modify this classic setting by introducing three types of consumers: myopic consumers, who always purchase at the initial full price; bargain-hunting consumers, who purchase only if the discounted price is sufficiently low; and strategic consumers, who strategi...
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作者：Katok, Elena; Wu, Diana Yan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Kansas
摘要：The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery...
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作者：Smith, Gary; Levere, Michael; Kurtzman, Robert
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Pomona College
摘要：We find that experienced poker players typically change their style of play after winning or losing a big pot-most notably, playing less cautiously after a big loss, evidently hoping for lucky cards that will erase their loss. This finding is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2) 263-292) break-even hypothesis and suggests that when investors incur a large loss, it might be time to take a ...
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作者：Lightle, John P.; Kagel, John H.; Arkes, Hal R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Group decision making provides a mechanism for channeling individual members' knowledge into productive organizational outcomes. However, in hidden pro. le experiments in which group members have common information favoring an inferior choice, with private information favoring a superior choice, groups typically choose an inferior alternative. We report a hidden profile experiment where we induce homogenous preferences over choice characteristics and provide financial incentives so that the co...
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作者：Muthukrishnan, A. V.; Wathieu, Luc; Xu, Alison Jing
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; European School of Management & Technology; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We propose that ambiguity aversion, as introduced in the literature on decision making under uncertainty, drives a preference for established brands in multiattribute choices among branded alternatives. Established brands are those for which belief in quality is held with greater confidence, even if specific attributes might be inferior to those of competing, less-established brands. In five experiments, we examine the role of ambiguity aversion in the preference for dominated, established bra...
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作者：Banal-Estanol, Albert; Ruperez Micola, Augusto
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We use simulations to study how the diversification of electricity generation portfolios influences wholesale prices. We find that the relationship between technological diversification and market prices is mediated by the supply-to-demand ratio. In each demand case there is a threshold where pivotal dynamics change. Pivotal dynamics pre- and post-threshold are the cause of nonlinearities in the influence of diversification on market prices. The findings are robust to changes in the main marke...
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作者：Chu, Leon Yang
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this padding method leads to a class o...
