Information Exchange in Group Decision Making: The Hidden Profile Problem Reconsidered

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lightle, John P.; Kagel, John H.; Arkes, Hal R.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0975
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 568-581
• 关键词: group decision making; information exchange; hidden profile

摘要

Group decision making provides a mechanism for channeling individual members' knowledge into productive organizational outcomes. However, in hidden pro. le experiments in which group members have common information favoring an inferior choice, with private information favoring a superior choice, groups typically choose an inferior alternative. We report a hidden profile experiment where we induce homogenous preferences over choice characteristics and provide financial incentives so that the common purpose assumptions of the model hold more completely than in past experiments. Nevertheless, groups continue to choose an inferior alternative most of the time. These failures primarily result from mistakes in recalling information. Mistakes in recalling common information (which favors an inferior candidate) are typically corrected, whereas mistakes in recalling the private information needed to uncover the hidden pro. le cannot be corrected. Therefore, the dismal performance of groups in pooling the information needed to identify the superior option primarily result from the structure of the problem rather than deficiencies in how groups share and process information. The discussions necessary to resolve mistakes in recalling common information also help to explain the often noted fact that groups spend a disproportionate amount of time discussing common information.