Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chu, Leon Yang
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1015
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1184-1198
• 关键词: strategy proofness; auction design; bidding with synergies; resource allocation

摘要

We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.