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作者：Cesarini, David; Johannesson, Magnus; Magnusson, Patrik K. E.; Wallace, Bjorn
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm School of Economics; Karolinska Institutet
摘要：A number of recent papers have examined the environmental and genetic sources of individual differences in economic and financial decision making. Here we contribute to this burgeoning literature by extending it to a number of key behavioral anomalies that are thought to be of importance for consumption, savings, and portfolio selection decisions. Using survey-based evidence from more than 11,000 Swedish twins, we demonstrate that a number of anomalies such as, for instance, the conjunction fa...
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作者：Price, Curtis R.
作者单位：University Southern Indiana
摘要：The purpose of this study is to investigate the use of competitive compensation between a manager and a worker in the laboratory. To this end, we impose a simple agency relationship between two groups of subjects termed managers and workers. The manager chooses a compensation scheme for the worker from either a piece rate or a tournament payment scheme and is paid based on the workers performance in the task. The results indicate that when given information about worker ability, male managers ...
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作者：van den Assem, Martijn J.; van Dolder, Dennie; Thaler, Richard H.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Chicago
摘要：We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a big peanuts phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, ...
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作者：Kuhnen, Camelia M.; Tymula, Agnieszka
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University
摘要：We examine whether private feedback about relative performance can mitigate moral hazard in competitive environments by modifying the agents' self-esteem. In our experimental setting, people work harder and expect to rank better when told that they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when feedback will not be provided. Individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output but expect a better rank in the future, whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output but lower...
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作者：Haselhuhn, Michael P.; Pope, Devin G.; Schweitzer, Maurice E.; Fishman, Peter
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee; University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Personal experience matters. In a field setting with longitudinal data, we disentangle the effects of learning new information from the effects of personal experience. We demonstrate that experience with a fine, controlling for the effect of learning new information, significantly boosts future compliance. We also show that experience with a large fine boosts compliance more than experience with a small fine, but that the influence of experience with both large and small fines decays sharply o...
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作者：Burks, Stephen V.; Krupka, Erin L.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Morris; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Nottingham; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and betwe...
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作者：Gneezy, Ayelet; Imas, Alex; Brown, Amber; Nelson, Leif D.; Norton, Michael I.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University
摘要：Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent...
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作者：Ho, Benjamin
作者单位：Vassar College
摘要：Apologies are part of a social institution designed to restore frayed relationships not only in daily life but also in the domains of corporate governance, medical malpractice litigation, political reputation, organizational culture, etc. The theory shows that in a general class of moral hazard games with imperfect information about agents with two-dimensional type, apologies exhibit regular properties-e.g., apologies are more frequent in long relationships, early in relationships, and between...
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作者：Brenner, Lyle A.; Griffin, Dale W.; Koehler, Derek J.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of British Columbia; University of Waterloo
摘要：We integrate a case-based model of probability judgment with prospect theory to explore asset pricing under uncertainty. Research within the heuristics and biases tradition suggests that probability judgments respond primarily to case-specific evidence and disregard aggregate characteristics of the class to which the case belongs, resulting in predictable biases. The dual-system framework presented here distinguishes heuristic assessments of value and evidence strength from deliberative assess...
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作者：Jian, Lian; Sami, Rahul
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, ...
