Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, Ayelet; Imas, Alex; Brown, Amber; Nelson, Leif D.; Norton, Michael I.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1437
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 179-187
• 关键词: Charitable giving; moral consistency; Licensing; field experiment

摘要

Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account.