A Multimethod Approach to Identifying Norms and Normative Expectations Within a Corporate Hierarchy: Evidence from the Financial Services Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burks, Stephen V.; Krupka, Erin L.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Morris; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Nottingham; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1478
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 203-217
• 关键词: ethics; NORMS; vignette; Survey; coordination game; incentive compatible; financial services; financial adviser; whistle-blowing; fiduciary responsibility; organizational fit

摘要

We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish mis-communication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment.