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作者：Kuntz, Ludwig; Mennicken, Roman; Scholtes, Stefan
作者单位：University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; RWI - Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Cambridge
摘要：Do hospitals experience safety tipping points as utilization increases, and if so, what are the implications for hospital operations management? We argue that safety tipping points occur when managerial escalation policies are exhausted and workload variability buffers are depleted. Front-line clinical staff is forced to ration resources and, at the same time, becomes more error prone as a result of elevated stress hormone levels. We confirm the existence of safety tipping points for in-hospit...
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作者：Levi, Shai; Zhang, Xiao-Jun
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Prior literature finds that long-lasting changes in firms' disclosure policies and information environment affect the cost of equity. Information asymmetry, however, also changes during the fiscal quarter. Firms disclose information periodically, and in between disclosure dates, traders can obtain private information, and adverse-selection risk increases. Such temporary increases in information asymmetry are usually considered to be diversifiable or too small to impact expected stock returns. ...
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作者：Armbruster, Benjamin; Delage, Erick
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We consider the problem of optimal decision making under uncertainty but assume that the decision maker's utility function is not completely known. Instead, we consider all the utilities that meet some criteria, such as preferring certain lotteries over other lotteries and being risk averse, S-shaped, or prudent. These criteria extend the ones used in the first- and second-order stochastic dominance framework. We then give tractable formulations for such decision-making problems. We formulate ...
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作者：Pang, Guodong; Perry, Ohad
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider large contact centers that handle two types of jobs-inbound and outbound-simultaneously, a process commonly referred to as call blending. Inbound work arrives to the system according to an exogenous arrival process, whereas outbound work is generated by the contact center. We assume that there is an infinite supply of outbound work to process, and that inbound calls are prioritized over the outbound calls. We propose a logarithmic safety staffing rule, combined with a threshold con...
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作者：Hegde, Deepak; Sampat, Bhaven
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：Private interest groups lobby politicians to influence public policy. However, little is known about how lobbying influences the policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world's largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public funding toward resea...
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作者：Bikard, Michael; Murray, Fiona; Gans, Joshua S.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto
摘要：When do scientists and other innovators organize into collaborative teams, and why do they do so for some projects and not others? At the core of this important organizational choice is, we argue, a trade-off scientists make between the productive efficiency of collaboration and the credit allocation that arises after the completion of collaborative work. In this paper, we explore this trade-off by developing a model to structure our understanding of the factors shaping researcher collaborativ...
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作者：Li, Jimmy Q.; Rusmevichientong, Paat; Simester, Duncan; Tsitsiklis, John N.; Zoumpoulis, Spyros I.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Southern California; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); INSEAD Business School
摘要：The feasibility of using field experiments to optimize marketing decisions remains relatively unstudied. We investigate category pricing decisions that require estimating a large matrix of cross-product demand elasticities and ask the following question: How many experiments are required as the number of products in the category grows? Our main result demonstrates that if the categories have a favorable structure, we can learn faster and reduce the number of experiments that are required: the ...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price-setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations. The analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms. We show that, in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital, nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins. Otherwise, firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in t...
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作者：Cao, Ying; Dhaliwal, Dan; Li, Zengquan; Yang, Yong George
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Arizona; Korea University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the impact of social networks on the ability of independent directors to obtain private information from their firms' executives. We find that independent directors socially connected to their firms' senior executives earn significantly higher returns than unconnected independent directors in stock sales transactions. The network effect on independent directors' trading profitability is stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry and with more powerful executives. In addition,...
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作者：Newton, David; Simutin, Mikhail
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper shows that the gender and age of the wage setter are crucial determinants of the disparity in wages between sexes. We document our findings using a data set on compensation of corporate officers that is uniquely suited for this analysis because officer wages are set by chief executive officers (CEOs). We show that CEOs pay officers of the opposite gender less than officers of their own gender, even when controlling for job characteristics. Older and male CEOs exhibit the greatest pr...
