Disclosure Policy and Industry Fluctuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertomeu, Jeremy; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1292-1305
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; Industrial Organization; COMPETITION; market structure; Firm strategy; business cycles; information sharing

摘要

This paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price-setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations. The analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms. We show that, in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital, nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins. Otherwise, firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in the product market. Under partial disclosure, firms withhold information during sharp industry expansions or declines. Consequently, the disclosure policy dampens the dissemination of shocks to the industry.