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作者:Rieger, Marc Oliver; Wang, Mei; Hens, Thorsten
作者单位:Universitat Trier; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Zurich; University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要:We present results from a large-scale international survey on risk preferences conducted in 53 countries. In all countries, we find, on average, an attitude of risk aversion in gains and of risk seeking in losses. The degree of risk aversion shows significant cross-country differences. Moreover, risk attitudes in our sample depend not only on economic conditions but also on cultural factors, as measured by the Hofstede dimensions individualism and uncertainty avoidance. The data may also serve...
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作者:Aggarwal, Rohit; Kryscynski, David; Singh, Harpreet
作者单位:Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Brigham Young University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:Although much research emphasizes the importance of venture technical competence for venture success and, therefore, the importance of venture technical competence in venture capitalist (VC) investment decisions, we know little about why some VCs may be better than others at assessing the technical competence of ventures. We gathered unique and proprietary data from 33 VCs and 308 ventures that sought Series A funding from those VCs. We show that VC assessment of ventures predicts VC investmen...
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作者:Cabral, Luis; Li, Lingfang (Ivy)
作者单位:New York University; Fudan University
摘要:We run a series of controlled field experiments on eBay where buyers are rewarded for providing feedback. Our results provide little support for the hypothesis of buyers' rational economic behavior: the likelihood of feedback barely increases as we increase feedback rebate values; also, the speed of feedback, bid levels, and the number of bids are all insensitive to rebate values. By contrast, we find evidence consistent with reciprocal buyer behavior. Lower transaction quality leads to a high...
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作者:Croitoru, Benjamin; Lu, Lei
作者单位:McGill University; Peking University
摘要:In this paper, we shed new light on the role of monetary policy in asset pricing by examining the case in which investors have heterogeneous expectations about future monetary policy. This case is realistic because central banks are typically less than perfectly open about their intentions. Accordingly, surveys of economists reveal that they frequently disagree in their expectations. Under heterogeneity in beliefs, investors place speculative bets against each other on the evolution of the mon...
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作者:Ma, Liye; Krishnan, Ramayya; Montgomery, Alan L.
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:Consumers who are close to one another in a social network often make similar purchase decisions. This similarity can result from latent homophily or social influence, as well as common exogenous factors. Latent homophily means consumers who are connected to one another are likely to have similar characteristics and product preferences. Social influence refers to the ability of one consumer to directly influence another consumer's decision based upon their communication. We present an empirica...
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作者:Overby, Eric; Forman, Chris
作者单位:University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要:The law of one price states that if prices for the same or highly similar goods vary across geographic locations by more than the cost of transport, then traders will shift supply and demand to exploit the price differences. However, several frictions prevent traders from doing this, including lack of information about prices and difficulty trading across locations. Electronic commerce has the potential to reduce these frictions by increasing price visibility and lowering transaction costs. We...
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作者:Hutton, Irena; Jiang, Danling; Kumar, Alok
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Miami
摘要:Using one of the largest samples of litigation data available to date, we examine whether the political culture of a firm determines its propensity for corporate misconduct. We measure political culture using the political contributions of top managers, firm political action committees, and local residents. We show that firms with a Republican culture are more likely to be the subject of civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation than are Democratic firms, consistent with the Democratic...
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作者:Bapna, Ravi; Umyarov, Akhmed
作者单位:University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要:Demonstrating compelling causal evidence of the existence and strength of peer-to-peer influence has become the holy grail of modern research in online social networks. In these networks, it has been consistently demonstrated that user characteristics and behavior tend to cluster both in space and in time. There are multiple well-known rival mechanisms that compete to be the explanation for this observed clustering. These range from peer influence to homophily to other unobservable external st...
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作者:Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael
作者单位:University of Southampton; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Central European University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要:Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and nonprofit sectors as well as in firms that engage in corporate philanthropy or other corporate social responsibility policies. This paper compares the effectiveness of a social incentive that takes the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject's choice to a financial incentive. We find that social incentives lead to a 13% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to p...
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作者:Guillen, Pablo; Merrett, Danielle; Slonim, Robert
作者单位:University of Sydney; University of Sydney
摘要:We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to theoretically solve free riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a voluntary contribution mechanism public goods game. The ICS includes an internal transfer payment from the lowest to highest contributing team proportional to the difference in group contributions. The ICS requires minimal information, makes the efficient contribution a dominant strategy, and is budget balanced. These features make the ICS ideally sui...