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作者：Daily, CM; Dalton, DR; Rajagopalan, N
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Southern California
摘要：The governance of organizations with dispersed ownership has received academic attention for over seven decades. Early research focused largely on managerial opportunism and mechanisms for minimizing its impact on shareholder wealth. The governance landscape has dramatically changed in the past several decades with the emergence of powerful owners such as institutional investors and large blockholders, as well as increased reliance on equity-based forms of compensation. Contemporary researcher...
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作者：Simon, M; Houghton, SM
作者单位：Oakland University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：To date, no field research has examined the effects of overconfidence on ill-structured decisions made by managers, such as product introductions. We explored this gap in the literature and found, in a study of high-technology firms, that overconfidence was positively related to the degree to which product introductions were pioneering (risky). Further, managers introducing pioneering products were more apt to express extreme certainty about achieving success, but these products were less like...
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作者：Chang, SJ
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determines ownership structure but not vice versa and provide strong evidence that controlling shareholders use insider information to take direct and indirect equity stakes in profitable or promising firms and transfer profits to affiliates through intragroup trade. These findings highlight the importance of...
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作者：Bergh, DD
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作者：Sanders, WG; Carpenter, MA
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Executives confront potentially conflicting pressures-maximizing shareholder wealth in the long term and appeasing shareholders in the near term. Because they must address near-term pressures to preserve tenure and to realize the benefits of long-term strategies, executives are increasingly likely to seek to mollify shareholders. We develop a behavioral-agency theoretical framework for studying how stock repurchase programs are used to help top managers appease shareholders. Analysis of 250 la...
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作者：Tihanyi, L; Johnson, RA; Hoskisson, RE; Hitt, MA
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We examined the roles of institutional investors, boards of directors, and technological opportunity in relation to international diversification. Our research contributes to both agency and foreign direct investment theories. In data on 197 large U.S. firms, we found significant relationships between institutional ownership and international diversification. International diversification was favored by (1) professional investment funds along with outside board members and (2) pension funds al...
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作者：Schulze, WS; Lubatkin, MH; Dino, RN
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University of Connecticut; emlyon business school
摘要：Using an agency-theoretic tens and insights drawn from the behavioral economics and family business literatures, we developed hypotheses concerning the effect of dispersion of ownership on the use of debt by private family-owned and family-managed firms. A field study of 1,464 family firms was conducted. Results suggest that, during periods of market growth, the relationship between the use of debt and the dispersion of ownership among directors at family firms can be graphed as a U-shaped cur...
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作者：Gomez-Mejia, LR; Larraza-Kintana, M; Makri, M
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：Family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be more insulated from risk and more sensitive to systematic (less controllable) business risk. The presence of institutional investors and R&D intensity play important moderating roles in these relationships.
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作者：McGuire, J; Matta, E
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Western University (University of Western Ontario); University Western Ontario Hospital
摘要：This study examines the ownership and performance implications of the exercise of CEO stock options. We find that the exercise of stock options has no impact on the levels of CEO equity and no relationship with subsequent firm performance. The decision to exercise stock options appears to reflect risk-balancing concerns rather than expectations for future performance.
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作者：Lee, PM; O'Neill, HM
作者单位：Emory University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This study analyzes the impact of ownership structure on R&D investments in the United States and Japan. It begins with the premise that U.S. and Japanese firms have distinct patterns of ownership that may result in disparities in R&D investments. Agency theory and stewardship theory are used to hypothesize about the relationship between ownership and R&D investments. Empirical evidence shows that the level of ownership concentration, and its impact, differ across countries. We argue that thes...
