Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schulze, WS; Lubatkin, MH; Dino, RN
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University of Connecticut; emlyon business school
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040613
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 179-194
• 关键词: TOP EXECUTIVE COMMITMENT; corporate; performance; strategy

摘要

Using an agency-theoretic tens and insights drawn from the behavioral economics and family business literatures, we developed hypotheses concerning the effect of dispersion of ownership on the use of debt by private family-owned and family-managed firms. A field study of 1,464 family firms was conducted. Results suggest that, during periods of market growth, the relationship between the use of debt and the dispersion of ownership among directors at family firms can be graphed as a U-shaped curve.