The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomez-Mejia, LR; Larraza-Kintana, M; Makri, M
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Universidad Publica de Navarra
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040616
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 226-237
• 关键词: ceo pay; performance; OWNERSHIP; FIRMS; MARKET; matter; RISK

摘要

Family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be more insulated from risk and more sensitive to systematic (less controllable) business risk. The presence of institutional investors and R&D intensity play important moderating roles in these relationships.