Strategic satisficing? A behavioral-agency theory perspective on stock repurchase program announcements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sanders, WG; Carpenter, MA
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/30040612
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 160-178
• 关键词: free cash flow; institutional investors; information asymmetry; corporate governance; firm performance; tender offers; MARKET; management; OWNERSHIP; COSTS

摘要

Executives confront potentially conflicting pressures-maximizing shareholder wealth in the long term and appeasing shareholders in the near term. Because they must address near-term pressures to preserve tenure and to realize the benefits of long-term strategies, executives are increasingly likely to seek to mollify shareholders. We develop a behavioral-agency theoretical framework for studying how stock repurchase programs are used to help top managers appease shareholders. Analysis of 250 large U.S. firms suggested that stock repurchase programs are variously a function of information asymmetry, risky stock-based incentives, and performance expectations.