-
作者：Eisfeldt, Andrea L.; Papanikolaou, Dimitris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders' perspective. We find that firms with more o...
-
作者：Garmaise, Mark J.; Natividad, Gabriel
摘要：The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitabilit...
-
作者：Seppi, Duane J.
-
作者：Derrien, Francois; Kecskes, Ambrus
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; York University - Canada
摘要：We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease th...
-
作者：Guiso, Luigi; Sapienza, Paola; Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：European University Institute; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We use survey data to measure households' propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them (strategic default) when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. The willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home-equity shortfall. Our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, such as views about fairness and morality. We also find that exposure to other people who s...
-
作者：Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shado...
-
作者：Mironov, Maxim
作者单位：IE University
摘要：This paper examines the interaction between income diversion and firm performance. Using unique Russian banking transaction data, I identify 42,483 spacemen, fly-by-night firms created specifically for income diversion. Next, I build a direct measure of income diversion for 45,429 companies and show that it is negatively related to firm performance. I identify the main reason for the observed effect as managerial diversion rather than tax evasion per se. I further show that stricter tax enforc...
-
作者：Singleton, Kenneth J.; Biais, Bruno; Roberts, Michael
-
作者：Glaser, Markus; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Sautner, Zacharias
作者单位：University of Munich; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex post performance and produc...
-
作者：Seppi, Duane J.
