Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glaser, Markus; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Sautner, Zacharias
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12046
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1577-1631
• 关键词: DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT; corporate-investment; information asymmetry; PAY SCHEME; dark side; management; FIRMS; entrenchment; connections; RESOURCES

摘要

We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.