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作者：Collin-Dufresne, Pierre; Fos, Vyacheslav
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Boston College
摘要：Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informe...
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作者：Patton, Andrew J.; Ramadorai, Tarun; Streatfield, Michael
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作者：Giroud, Xavier; Mueller, Holger M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We document how a positive shock to investment opportunities at one plant (treated plant) spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, the firm's headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-w...
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作者：Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel G.; Stein, Jeremy C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short-term money-li...
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作者：Bernstein, Shai
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of going public on innovation by comparing the innovation activity of firms that go public with firms that withdraw their initial public offering (IPO) filing and remain private. NASDAQ fluctuations during the book-building phase are used as an instrument for IPO completion. Using patent-based metrics, I find that the quality of internal innovation declines following the IPO, and firms experience both an exodus of skilled inventors and a decline in the produ...
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作者：Qian, Jun (Qj); Strahan, Philip E.; Yang, Zhishu
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tsinghua University
摘要：In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes ...
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作者：Singleton, Kenneth J.; Biais, Bruno; Roberts, Michael
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作者：Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique
作者单位：Boston University; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of controlling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less efficient acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a fire sale price. Third, absent a liquidity shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. Using a structural estimation approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public ...
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作者：Bouvard, Matthieu; Chaigneau, Pierre; de Motta, Adolfo
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank-specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment pr...
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作者：Adelino, Manuel; Lewellen, Katharina; Sundaram, Anant
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper examines investment choices of nonprofit hospitals. It tests how shocks to cash flows caused by the performance of the hospitals' financial assets affect hospital expenditures. Capital expenditures increase, on average, by 10 to 28 cents for every dollar received from financial assets. The sensitivity is similar to that found earlier for shareholder-owned corporations. Executive compensation, other salaries, and perks do not respond significantly to cash flow shocks. Hospitals with ...
