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作者：Han, Joongho; Park, Kwangwoo; Pennacchi, George
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less-efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan-selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states tha...
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作者：Khanna, Vikramaditya; Kim, E. Han; Lu, Yao
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying o...
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作者：Cole, Shawn; Kanz, Martin; Klapper, Leora
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; The World Bank
摘要：We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does...
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作者：Agarwal, Vikas; Mullally, Kevin A.; Tang, Yuehua; Yang, Baozhong
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Cologne; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Singapore Management University
摘要：We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those ho...
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作者：Bond, Philip; Goldstein, Itay
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Governments intervene in firms' lives in a variety of ways. To enhance the efficiency of government intervention, many researchers and policy makers call for governments to make use of information contained in stock market prices. However, price informativeness is endogenous to government policy. We analyze government policy in light of this endogeneity. In some cases, it is optimal for a government to commit to limit its reliance on market prices to avoid harming the aggregation of informatio...
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作者：Pool, Veronika K.; Stoffman, Noah; Yonker, Scott E.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Cornell University
摘要：We find that socially connected fund managers have more similar holdings and trades. The overlap of funds whose managers reside in the same neighborhood is considerably higher than that of funds whose managers live in the same city but in different neighborhoods. These effects are larger when managers share a similar ethnic background, and are not explained by preferences. Valuable information is transmitted through these peer networks: a long-short strategy composed of stocks purchased minus ...
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作者：Dougal, Casey; Parsons, Christopher A.; Titman, Sheridan
作者单位：Drexel University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We find that a firm's investment is highly sensitive to the investments of other firms headquartered nearby, even those in very different industries. A firm's investment also responds to fluctuations in the cash flows and stock prices (q) of local firms outside its sector. These patterns do not appear to reflect exogenous area shocks such as local shocks to labor or real estate values, but rather suggest that local agglomeration economies are important determinants of firm investment and growth.
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作者：Sockin, Michael; Xiong, Wei
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper develops a model with a tractable log-linear equilibrium to analyze the effects of informational frictions in commodity markets. By aggregating dispersed information about the strength of the global economy among goods producers whose production has complementarity, commodity prices serve as price signals to guide producers' production decisions and commodity demand. Our model highlights important feedback effects of informational noise originating from supply shocks and futures mar...
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作者：Collin-Dufresne, Pierre; Fos, Vyacheslav
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Boston College
摘要：Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informe...
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作者：Patton, Andrew J.; Ramadorai, Tarun; Streatfield, Michael
