The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Qian, Jun (Qj); Strahan, Philip E.; Yang, Zhishu
• 署名单位: Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12251
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1457-1493
• 关键词: distance; FIRMS; ORGANIZATIONS; hierarchies; constraints; COMPETITION; authority; matter; CHINA; RISK

摘要

In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.