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作者：Deng, Xin; Kang, Jun-koo; Low, Buen Sin
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：Using a large sample of mergers in the US, we examine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) creates value for acquiring firms' shareholders. We find that compared with low CSR acquirers, high CSR acquirers realize higher merger announcement returns, higher announcement returns on the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, and larger increases in post-merger long-term operating performance. They also realize positive long-term stock returns, suggesting that the market ...
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作者：Edelman, Daniel; Fung, William; Hsieh, David A.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Duke University
摘要：This paper investigates mega hedge fund management companies that collectively manage over 50% of the industry's assets, incorporating previously unavailable data from those that do not report to commercial databases. We find similarities among mega firms that report performance to commercial databases compared with those that do not. We show that the largest divergences between the performance of reporting and nonreporting mega firms can be traced to differential exposure to credit markets. T...
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作者：Goldstein, Itay; Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London Business School; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, in which speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite...
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作者：Novy-Marx, Robert
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Profitability, measured by gross profits-to-assets, has roughly the same power as book-to-market predicting the cross section of average returns. Profitable firms generate significantly higher returns than unprofitable firms, despite having significantly higher valuation ratios. Controlling for profitability also dramatically increases the performance of value strategies, especially among the largest, most liquid stocks. These results are difficult to reconcile with popular explanations of the...
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作者：Irani, Rustom M.; Oesch, David
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of St Gallen
摘要：Using an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers, we find that a reduction in coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality. The effect of coverage on disclosure is more pronounced for firms with weak shareholder rights, consistent with a substitution effect between analyst monitoring and other corporate governance mechanisms. The effects we uncover using our experimental design are an order of magnitude larger ...
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作者：Field, Laura; Lowry, Michelle; Mkrtchyan, Anahit
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northeastern University
摘要：Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects ...
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作者：Cronqvist, Henrik; Fahlenbrach, Ruediger
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a significant portion of equity grants performance-vests based on prespecified measures and that unvested equity is forfeited by fired CEOs. Private equity sponsors do not reduce base salaries, bonuses, and perks, but redesign contracts away from qua...
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作者：Opp, Christian C.; Opp, Marcus M.; Harris, Milton
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper develops a theoretical framework to shed light on variation in credit rating standards over time and across asset classes. Ratings issued by credit rating agencies serve a dual role: they provide information to investors and are used to regulate institutional investors. We show that introducing rating-contingent regulation that favors highly rated securities may increase or decrease rating informativeness, but unambiguously increases the volume of highly rated securities. If the reg...
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作者：Carney, Richard W.; Child, Travers Barclay
作者单位：Australian National University; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We investigate changes to the ownership and control of East Asia's largest companies in 1996 and 2008. Newly compiled data for 1386 publicly traded companies at the end of 2008 are supplemented with existing data on 1,606 publicly traded companies at the end of 1996. Two main findings stand out. First, where status quo political arrangements persist, preexisting ownership arrangements go unchanged or become more entrenched. Where major political changes occurred, corporate ownership would unde...
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作者：Dow, James
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：Existing research on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover focuses on CEO ability. This paper argues that board ability is also important. Corporate boards are reluctant to replace CEOs, as this makes financing expensive by sending a negative signal about board ability. Entrenchment in this model does not result from CEO power, or from agency problems. Entrenchment is mitigated when there are more assets-in-place relative to investment opportunities. The paper also compares public and private...
