Are busy boards detrimental?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Field, Laura; Lowry, Michelle; Mkrtchyan, Anahit
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northeastern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 63-82
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Board of directors; initial public offerings; venture capital

摘要

Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.