CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cronqvist, Henrik; Fahlenbrach, Ruediger
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.013
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 659-674
• 关键词: LBOs; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS; Contracting theory; Executive compensation

摘要

We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a significant portion of equity grants performance-vests based on prespecified measures and that unvested equity is forfeited by fired CEOs. Private equity sponsors do not reduce base salaries, bonuses, and perks, but redesign contracts away from qualitative measures. They use some subjective performance evaluation, do not use indexed or premium options, and do not condition vesting on relative industry performance. We compare the contracts to predictions from contracting theories, and relate our results to discussions of executive compensation reform. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.