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作者：Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy...
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作者：Bena, Jan; Ortiz-Molina, Hernan
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds to new firms that, due to large investment requirements and low pledgeable cash flows, cannot raise enough external financing. The financing advantage of pyramidal structures is pervasive in many count...
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作者：Albuquerque, Ana M.; De Franco, Gus; Verdi, Rodrigo S.
作者单位：Boston University; University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of h...
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作者：Gao, Huasheng; Harford, Jarrad; Li, Kai
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of British Columbia
摘要：We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities...
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作者：Bessembinder, Hendrik; Zhang, Feng
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：The well-documented abnormal long-run buy-and-hold returns to firms issuing equity in initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, firms bidding in mergers, and firms initiating dividends can be attributed to imperfect control-firm matching. In addition to firm size and market-to-book ratio, event firms on average differ from control firms in terms of idiosyncratic volatility, liquidity, return momentum, and capital investment, each of which also explains returns. We propose a simpl...
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作者：Agrawal, Ashwini K.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Recent studies have debated the impact of investor protection law on corporate behavior and value. I exploit the staggered passage of state securities fraud statutes (blue sky laws) in the United States to estimate the causal effects of investor protection law on firm financing decisions and investment activity. The statutes induce firms to increase dividends, issue equity, and grow in size. The laws also facilitate improvements in operating performance and market valuations. Overall, the evid...
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作者：Yang, Fan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I identify a slope factor in the cross section of commodity futures returns: high-basis commodity futures have higher loadings on this factor than low-basis commodity futures. Combined with a level factor (an index of commodity futures), this slope factor explains most of the average excess returns of commodity futures portfolios sorted by basis. More importantly, I find that this factor is significantly correlated with investment shocks, which represent the technological progress in producing...
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作者：Loughran, Tim; McDonald, Bill
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Form S-1 is the first SEC filing in the initial public offering (IPO) process. The tone of the S-1, in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm's business strategy and operations, should affect investors' ability to value the IPO. We find that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions, and subsequent volatility. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty, bookbuilding, and prospect ...
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作者：Boutin, Xavier; Cestone, Giacinta; Fumagalli, Chiara; Pica, Giovanni; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; European Corporate Governance Institute; Bocconi University; University of Salerno; Bocconi University; University of Oxford
摘要：We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms' access to business group deep pockets affects the entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper shows that entry into manufacturing industries is negatively related to the cash hoarded by incumbent affiliated groups and positively related to entrant groups' cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact of group cash holdingson entry is more important in environment...
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作者：Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam; Weisbach, Michael S.
作者单位：Northeastern University; Harvard University; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We analyze a unique database from a sample of real-world boardrooms - minutes of board meetings and board-committee meetings of eleven business companies for which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest. We use these data to evaluate the underlying assumptions and predictions of models of boards of directors. These models generally fall into two categories: managerial models that assume boards play a direct role in managing the firm, and supervisory models that assume that ...
