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作者：Hoff, K; Sen, A
作者单位：The World Bank; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Calcutta
摘要：We show that individuals with identical preferences and abilities can self-organize into communities with starkly different civic environments. Specifically, we consider a multi-community city where community quality depends upon residents' efforts to prevent crime, improve local governance, etc. Homeownership raises incentives for such civic efforts, but is beyond the reach of the poor. Within-community externalities lead to segregated cities: the rich reside in healthy homeowner communities,...
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作者：Hatfield, JW; Milgrom, PR
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a wor...
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作者：Peek, J; Rosengren, ES
作者单位：University of Kentucky; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston
摘要：We examine the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Finns are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they are in poor financial condition, because troubled Japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This evergreening behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reporte...
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作者：Urquiola, M
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University
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作者：Charness, G; Levin, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
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作者：Brunnermeier, MK; Parker, JA
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, ...
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作者：Osborne, MJ; Rosenthal, JS; Turner, MA
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto
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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's response in a market, wherein a firm engages in confidential settlements, may be to reduce demand. A firm committed to openness incurs higher liability and R&D costs, though product demand is not diminished. We identify conditions such that, if...
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作者：Snyder, JM Jr; Ting, MM; Ansolabehere, S
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coaliti...
