Matching with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, JW; Milgrom, PR
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825466
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 913-935
• 关键词: LEVEL LABOR-MARKETS; stable matchings; college admissions; gross substitutes; STABILITY; DESIGN; allocation; physicians; mechanism; CONFLICT

摘要

We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.