Legislative bargaining under weighted voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Snyder, JM Jr; Ting, MM; Ansolabehere, S
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825538
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 981-1004
• 关键词: COUNCIL-OF-MINISTERS; POWER INDEXES; european-union; PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES; decision-making; COALITION GOVERNMENTS; PROPOSAL REQUIRES; stochastic-model; EU; payoffs

摘要

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.