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作者：Meltzer, Allan H.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
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作者：McFadden, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者：Maggi, Giovanni; Morelli, Massimo
作者单位：Princeton University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms: each c...
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作者：Bundorf, M. Kate; Simon, Kosali I.
作者单位：Stanford University; Cornell University
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作者：Goldin, Claudia
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Li, David Daokui; Feng, Junxin; Jiang, Hongping
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
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作者：Anderson, SP; Renault, R
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct information. Many do not mention prices. We analyze a monopoly firm's choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only product information, price information, or both, and prefers to convey only limited product information if possible. It is socially harmful l to force it to provide full information if it has sufficient ability to parse the information imparted, nor does...
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作者：Jayachandran, S; Kremer, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Trade sanctions are often criticized as ineffective because they create incentives for evasion or as harmful to the target country's population. Loan sanctions, in contrast, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population from being saddled with odious debt run up by tooting or repressive dictators. Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of countries' assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after sanctions were imposed. This would re...
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作者：Svensson, LEO
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Beaudry, Paul; Portier, Franck
作者单位：University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universite de Toulouse
