Odious debt
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jayachandran, S; Kremer, M
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/000282806776157696
发表日期：
2006
页码：
82-92
关键词：
摘要：
Trade sanctions are often criticized as ineffective because they create incentives for evasion or as harmful to the target country's population. Loan sanctions, in contrast, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population from being saddled with odious debt run up by tooting or repressive dictators. Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of countries' assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after sanctions were imposed. This would reduce creditors' incentives to lend to sanctioned regimes. Restricting sanctions to cover only loans made after the sanction was imposed would help avoid time-consistency problems.