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作者:Kuruscu, Burhanettin
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
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作者:Lerner, Josh; Pathak, Parag A.; Tirole, Jean
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者:Mendoza, Enrique G.
作者单位:International Monetary Fund
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作者:Shapiro, Carl
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者:Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Crawford, Vincent P.
作者单位:University of York - UK; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules. Subjects' decisions and searches show that most subjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many had simplified models of others' d...
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作者:Barberis, Nicholas; Huang, Ming; Thaler, Richard H.
作者单位:Yale University; Cornell University; Cornell University; University of Chicago
摘要:We argue that narrow framing, whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, may be a more important feature of decision-making than previously realized. Our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small, independent gamble, even when the gamble is actuarially favorable. We find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions, including many nonexpected utility specifications, have trouble explaining this evidence, but that this di...
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作者:Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina; Pozo, Susan
作者单位:California State University System; San Diego State University; Western Michigan University
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作者:Pizer, William A.
作者单位:Resources for the Future
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作者:Bergstrom, TC
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
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作者:Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位:Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要:We propose that a simple dual-self model gives a unified explanation,for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to re...