Self-enforcing voting in international organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maggi, Giovanni; Morelli, Massimo
• 署名单位: Princeton University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1137
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1137-1158
• 关键词: Collusion; rules

摘要

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to comply with the collective decision or, in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model identifies conditions under which the organization adopts the unanimity rule, and yields rich comparative-statics predictions on the determinants of the mode of governance.