Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dal Bo, Pedro; Foster, Andrew; Putterman, Louis
• 署名单位: Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2205
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2205-2229
• 关键词: prisoners-dilemma; voter participation; coordination games; social preferences; COOPERATION; IMPACT; induction; transfers; carrot; stick

摘要

A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions. (JEL C91, D02, D12, D72)