Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2230
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2230-2260
• 关键词: caps; DESIGN

摘要

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case. (JEL D44, D72, D82)