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作者：Leon-Ledesma, Miguel A.; McAdam, Peter; Willman, Alpo
作者单位：University of Kent; European Central Bank
摘要：The capital-labor substitution elasticity and technical biases in production are critical parameters. The received wisdom claims their joint identification is infeasible. We challenge that interpretation. Putting the new approach of normalized production functions at the heart of a Monte Carlo analysis we identify the conditions under which identification is feasible and robust. The key result is that jointly modeling the production function and first-order conditions is superior to single-equ...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Miniaci, Raffaele; Piovesan, Marco; Ponti, Giovanni
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Brescia; University of Copenhagen; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents choose to work for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agen...
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作者：Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Panunzi, Fausto
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Naples Federico II; Bocconi University
摘要：Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms. Moreov...
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作者：Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions ar...
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作者：Frankel, Jeffrey; Xie, Daniel
作者单位：Harvard University; Peterson Institute for International Economics
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John
作者单位：Middlebury College; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
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作者：Herweg, Fabian; Mueller, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society
摘要：We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreov...
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作者：Bacchetta, Philippe; van Wincoop, Eric
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Virginia
摘要：A major puzzle in international finance is that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate (forward discount puzzle). Motivated by the fact that only a small fraction of foreign currency holdings is actively managed, we calibrate a two-country model in which agents make infrequent portfolio decisions. We show that the model can account for the forward discount puzzle. It can also account for several related empirical phenomena, including that of delayed overshooting. We also show that ma...
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作者：Ostrom, Elinor
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
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作者：Horn, Henrik; Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.
