Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horn, Henrik; Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.394
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 394-419
• 关键词: tariffs

摘要

We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.