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作者:Conti, Gabriella; Heckman, James; Urzua, Sergio
作者单位:University of Chicago; Northwestern University; Northwestern University
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作者:Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
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作者:Duggan, Mark; Morton, Fiona Scott
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Yale University
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作者:Chen, Yan; Harper, F. Maxwell; Konstan, Joseph; Li, Sherry Xin
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent. When given outcome information about the average user's net benefit score, above-average users mainly enga...
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作者:Jia, Panle; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Mendoza, Enrique G.
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要:Financial crashes were followed by deep recessions in the Sudden Stops of emerging economies. An equilibrium business cycle model with a collateral constraint explains this phenomenon as a result of the amplification and asymmetry that the constraint induces in the responses of macro-aggregates to shocks. Leverage rises during expansions, and when it rises enough it triggers the constraint, causing a Fisherian deflation that reduces credit and the price and quantity of collateral assets. Outpu...
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作者:Acemoglu, Daron; Yared, Pierre
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University
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作者:Corrado, Carol A.; Hulten, Charles R.
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Ivashina, Victoria; Scharfstein, David
作者单位:Harvard University; Harvard University
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作者:Wang, Joseph Tao-yi; Spezio, Michael; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位:National Taiwan University; California Institute of Technology; Claremont Colleges; Scripps College
摘要:We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects overcommunicate-messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects t...