Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martin, Christopher; Puri, Manju; Ufier, Alexander
• 署名单位: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70007
• 发表日期: 2026-04
• 关键词: RUNS; panics

摘要

Using unique, daily, account-level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit inflows are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term deposit rates. This phenomenon holds in a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action, suggesting that insured deposit inflows are an important mechanism that weakens depositor discipline.