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作者：Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Grinstein, Yaniv; Peyer, Urs
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
摘要：We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on lucky grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors. Lucky grants to both CEOs and directors were the product of deliberate choices, not of firms' routines, and were timed to make them more profitable. Lucky grants are associated with higher CEO compensati...
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作者：Rampini, Adriano A.; Viswanathan, S.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Collateral constraints imply that financing and risk management are fundamentally linked. The opportunity cost of engaging in risk management and conserving debt capacity to hedge future financing needs is forgone current investment, and is higher for more productive and less well-capitalized firms. More constrained firms engage in less risk management and may exhaust their debt capacity and abstain from risk management, consistent with empirical evidence and in contrast to received theory. Wh...
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作者：Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel; Stein, Jeremy C.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is high...
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作者：Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst; Spalt, Oliver
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Mannheim; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse. We calibrate a stylized principal-agent model to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations. We also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible pay...
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作者：Cesarini, David; Johannesson, Magnus; Lichtenstein, Paul; Sandewall, Oerjan; Wallace, Bjorn
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Stockholm School of Economics; Karolinska Institutet
摘要：Individuals differ in how they construct their investment portfolios, yet empirical models of portfolio risk typically account only for a small portion of the cross-sectional variance. This paper asks whether genetic variation can explain some of these individual differences. Following a major pension reform Swedish adults had to form a portfolio from a large menu of funds. We match data on these investment decisions with the Swedish Twin Registry and find that approximately 25% of individual ...
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作者：Gatchev, Vladimir A.; Pulvino, Todd; Tarhan, Vefa
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Northwestern University; Loyola University Chicago
摘要：We develop a dynamic multiequation model where firms make financing and investment decisions jointly subject to the constraint that sources must equal uses of cash. We argue that static models of financial decisions produce inconsistent coefficient estimates, and that models that do not acknowledge the interdependence among decision variables produce inefficient estimates and provide an incomplete and potentially misleading view of financial behavior. We use our model to examine whether firms ...
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作者：Doidge, Craig; Karolyi, G. Andrew; Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Cornell University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms' insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock-price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those fir...
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作者：Barras, Laurent; Scaillet, Olivier; Wermers, Russ
作者单位：McGill University; University of Geneva; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper develops a simple technique that controls for false discoveries, or mutual funds that exhibit significant alphas by luck alone. Our approach precisely separates funds into (1) unskilled, (2) zero-alpha, and (3) skilled funds, even with dependencies in cross-fund estimated alphas. We find that 75% of funds exhibit zero alpha (net of expenses), consistent with the Berk and Green equilibrium. Further, we find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1996, but...
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作者：Rice, Tara; Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：While relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion permitted banking organizations to expand across state lines, it allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion. These differences in states' branching restrictions affect credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Firms in open states also are more likely to borrow from banks. Despite this evidence that intersta...
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作者：Peress, Joel
摘要：How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private in...
