Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Grinstein, Yaniv; Peyer, Urs
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01618.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2363-2401
• 关键词: stock option awards; corporate governance; BOARD COMPOSITION; COMPENSATION; Managers; WEALTH

摘要

We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on lucky grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors. Lucky grants to both CEOs and directors were the product of deliberate choices, not of firms' routines, and were timed to make them more profitable. Lucky grants are associated with higher CEO compensation from other sources, no majority of independent directors, no outside blockholder on the compensation committee, and a long-serving CEO.