Why Do Foreign Firms Leave US Equity Markets?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doidge, Craig; Karolyi, G. Andrew; Stulz, Rene M.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Cornell University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01577.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1507-1553
• 关键词: SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; GOING-PRIVATE DECISIONS; corporate governance; cross-listings; economic consequences; GO DARK; returns; IMPACT; event; bankruptcy

摘要

Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms' insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock-price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock-price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h-6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.