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作者：Honore, Bo E.; Lleras-Muney, Adriana
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：In 1971, President Nixon declared war on cancer. Thirty years later, many declared this war a failure: the age-adjusted mortality rate from cancer in 2000 was essentially the same as in the early 1970s. Meanwhile the age-adjusted mortality rate from cardiovascular disease fell dramatically. Since the causes that underlie cancer and cardiovascular disease are likely dependent, the decline in mortality rates from cardiovascular disease may partially explain the lack of progress in cancer mortali...
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作者：Horner, Johannes; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：Northwestern University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.
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作者：Gossner, Olivier; Hernandez, Penelope; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Northwestern University; Universitat d'Alacant; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
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作者：Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Arizona; University of Arizona
摘要：We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe....
