Optimal use of communication resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gossner, Olivier; Hernandez, Penelope; Neyman, Abraham
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Northwestern University; Universitat d'Alacant; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1603-1636
• 关键词: games

摘要

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.