The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Horner, Johannes; Olszewski, Wojciech
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1499-1544
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; INFORMATION; equilibria; COMMUNICATION

摘要

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.