Promises and partnership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Arizona; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1579-1601
• 关键词: social norms; COMMUNICATION; preferences; fairness; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; Guilt

摘要

We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.