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作者：Garrat, R; Tröger, T
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Bonn
摘要：In standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator-a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private-value bidders. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whet...
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作者：Andrews, DWK; Moreira, MJ; Stock, JH
作者单位：Yale University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper considers tests of the parameter on an endogenous variable in an instrumental variables regression model. The focus is on determining tests that have some optimal power properties. We start by considering a model with normally distributed errors and known error covariance matrix. We consider tests that are similar and satisfy a natural rotational invariance condition. We determine a two-sided power envelope for invariant similar tests. This allows us to assess and compare the power ...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Meyer-Ter-Vehn, M; Moldovanu, B; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Bonn
摘要：The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents' beliefs about others suggests the use of more robust notions of implementation such as ex post implementation, which requires that each agent's strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other agents. We show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multidimensional signals, interdependent valuations, and transferable utilities arc ...
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作者：Honore, Bo E.; Lleras-Muney, Adriana
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：In 1971, President Nixon declared war on cancer. Thirty years later, many declared this war a failure: the age-adjusted mortality rate from cancer in 2000 was essentially the same as in the early 1970s. Meanwhile the age-adjusted mortality rate from cardiovascular disease fell dramatically. Since the causes that underlie cancer and cardiovascular disease are likely dependent, the decline in mortality rates from cardiovascular disease may partially explain the lack of progress in cancer mortali...
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作者：Fernández-Villaverde, JF; Rubio-Ramírez, JF; Santos, MS
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This paper studies the econometrics of computed dynamic models. Since these models generally lack a closed-form solution, their policy functions are approximated by numerical methods. Hence, the researcher can only evaluate an approximated likelihood associated with the approximated policy function rather than the exact likelihood implied by the exact policy function. What are the consequences for inference of the use of approximated likelihoods? First, we find conditions under which, as the a...
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作者：Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper examines an exchange economy with heterogeneous indivisible objects that can be substitutable or complementary. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists in such economies, provided that all the objects can be partitioned into two groups, and from the viewpoint of each agent, objects in the same group are substitutes and objects across the two groups are complements. This condition generalizes the well-known Kelso-Crawford gross substitutes condition and is called gross substitu...
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作者：Han, C; Phillips, PCB
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington; Yale University; University of Auckland; University of York - UK
摘要：This paper provides a first order asymptotic theory for generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators when the number of moment conditions is allowed to increase with the sample size and the moment conditions may be weak. Examples in which these asymptotics are relevant include instrumental variable (IV) estimation with many (possibly weak or uninformed) instruments and some panel data models that cover moderate time spans and have correspondingly large numbers of instruments. Under certain r...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Chatterji, Shurojit; Lavi, Ron; Mu'alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; California Institute of Technology; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this age...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence; Easley, David
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper provides an analysis of the asymptotic properties of Pareto optimal consumption allocations in a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers. In particular, we investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. We show that in any Pareto-optimal allocation whether each consumer vanishes or survives is determined entirely by discount factors and beliefs. Whereas equilibrium allocations in economies with complete ma...
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作者：Horner, Johannes; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：Northwestern University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.
