Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil; Chatterji, Shurojit; Lavi, Ron; Mu'alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam; Sen, Arunava
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; California Institute of Technology; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1109-1132
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; mechanism design; combinatorial auctions; efficient

摘要

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.