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作者：Heifetz, A; Neeman, Z
作者单位：Open University Israel; Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A number of studies, most notably Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in generic type spaces that admit a common prior and are of a fixed finite size, an uninformed seller can design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from privately informed bidders. We show that this result hinges on the nonconvexity of such a family of priors. When the ambient family of priors is convex, generic priors do not allow for full surplus extraction provided that for at least one prior in this fami...
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作者：Rubinstein, Ariel
摘要：What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models ...
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作者：Amador, M; Werning, I; Angeletos, GM
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in a consumption-savings model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets. On the other hand, they also expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self-control, and thus they value the commitment afforded by smaller choice sets. The optimal commitment problem we study is to find the best subset of the individual's budget set. This...
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作者：Angrist, J; Chernozhukov, V; Fernández-Val, I
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston University
摘要：Quantile regression (QR) fits a linear model for conditional quantiles just as ordinary least squares (OLS) fits a linear model for conditional means. An attractive feature of OLS is that it gives the minimum mean-squared error linear approximation to the conditional expectation function even when the linear model is misspecified. Empirical research using quantile regression with discrete covariates suggests that QR may have a similar property, but the exact nature of the linear approximation ...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Arizona; University of Arizona
摘要：We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe....
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yonsei University
摘要：A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second-best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a se...
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作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Liang, Meng-Yu
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions van...
