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作者：Schilbach, Frank
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies alcohol consumption among low-income workers in India. In a 3-week field experiment, the majority of 229 cycle-rickshaw drivers were willing to forgo substantial monetary payments in order to set incentives for themselves to remain sober, thus exhibiting demand for commitment to sobriety. Randomly receiving sobriety incentives significantly reduced daytime drinking while leaving overall drinking unchanged. I find no evidence of higher daytime sobriety significantly changing ...
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作者：Lieber, Ethan M. J.; Lockwood, Lee M.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Making a transfer in kind reduces its value to recipients but can improve targeting. We develop an approach to quantiffing this trade-off and apply it to home care. Using randomized experiments by Medicaid, we find that in-kind provision significantly reduces the value of the transfer to recipients while targeting a small fraction of the eligible population that is sicker and has fewer informal care-givers than the average eligible. Under a wide range of assumptions within a standard model, th...
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作者：He, Zhiguo; Krishnamurthy, Arvind; Milbradt, Konstantin
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：What makes an asset a safe asset? We study a model where two countries each issue sovereign bonds to satisfy investors' safe asset demands. The countries differ in the float of their bonds and the fundamental resources available to rollover debts. A sovereign's debt is safer if its fundamentals are strong relative to other possible safe assets, not merely strong on an absolute basis. If demand for safe assets is high, a large float enhances safety through. a market depth benefit. If demand for...
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作者：Fack, Gabrielle; Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Rice University
摘要：We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may he restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college am...
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作者：Asker, John; Collard-Wexler, Allan; De Loecker, Jan
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; KU Leuven
摘要：We propose an approach to measuring the misallocation of production in a market that compares actual industry cost curves to undistorted (counterfactual) supply curves. As compared to traditional, TFPR-based, misallocation measures, this approach leverages cost data, such. that results are readily mapped to welfare metrics. As an application, we analyze global crude oil extraction and quantifj the extent of misallocation therein, together with the proportion attributable to market power. From ...
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作者：Finkelstein, Amy; Hendren, Nathaniel; Shepard, Mark
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：How much are low-income individuals willing to pay for health insurance, and what are the implications for insurance markets? Using administrative data from Massachusetts' subsidized insurance exchange, we exploit discontinuities in the subsidy schedule to estimate willingness to pay and costs of insurance among low-income adults. As subsidies decline, insurance take-up falls rapidly, dropping about 25 percent for each $40 increase in monthly enrollee premiums. Marginal enrollees tend to be lo...
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作者：Brandt, Loren; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes; Wang, Luhang; Zhang, Yifan
作者单位：University of Toronto; KU Leuven; Xiamen University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
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作者：Malenko, Andrey; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In many cases, buyers are not informed about their valuations and rely on experts, who are informed but biased for overbidding. We study auction design when selling to such advised buyers. We show that a canonical dynamic auction, the English auction, has a natural equilibrium that outperforms standard static auctions in expected revenues and allocative efficiency. The ability to Communicate as the auction proceeds allows for more informative communication and gives advisors the ability to per...
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作者：Blanchard, Olivier
作者单位：Peterson Institute for International Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This lecture focuses on the costs of public debt when rates are low. I develop four main arguments. First, I show that the current us situation, in which safe interest rates are expected to remain below growth rates for a long time, is more the historical norm than the exception. If the figure is like the past, this implies that debt rollovers, that is the issuance of debt without a later increase in taxes, may well be feasible. Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost. Second, even in...
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作者：Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezso
作者单位：University of Arizona; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Bonn
摘要：A decision maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about each. The decision maker can either get advice from the expert or delegate decision making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns his privately optimal action and chooses it. Under communication, advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses from strategic communication. ...
