Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezso
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161109
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1349-1374
• 关键词: cheap-talk; advice

摘要

A decision maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about each. The decision maker can either get advice from the expert or delegate decision making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns his privately optimal action and chooses it. Under communication, advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses from strategic communication. We characterize the communication problems that make the expert acquire information of equal use to expert and decision maker. In these problems, communication outperforms delegation. (JEL, D82, D83)