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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Yale University; National University of Singapore; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, ...
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作者：Kneeland, Terri
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Strategic choice data from a carefully chosen set of ring-network games are used to obtain individual-level estimates of higher-order rationality. The experimental design exploits a natural exclusion restriction that is considerably weaker than the assumptions underlying alternative designs in the literature. In our data set, 93 percent of subjects are rational, 71 percent are rational and believe others are rational, 44 percent are rational and hold second-order beliefs that others are ration...
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作者：Mossel, Elchanan; Sly, Allan; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network. We show that the question of whether or not the agents learn efficiently depends on the topology of the social network. In particular, we identify a geometric egalitarianism condition on the social network that guarantees learning in infinite networks...
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作者：Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We consider a large market where auctioneers with private reservation values compete for bidders by announcing cheap-talk messages. If auctioneers run efficient first-price auctions, then there always exists an equilibrium in which each auctioneer truthfully reveals her type. The equilibrium is constrained efficient, assigning more bidders to auctioneers with larger gains from trade. The choice of the trading mechanism is crucial for the result. Most notably, the use of second-price auctions (...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; De Rock, Bram; Lewbel, Arthur; Vermeulen, Frederic
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Boston College; KU Leuven
摘要：We propose a method to set identify bounds on the sharing rule for a general collective household consumption model. Unlike the effects of distribution factors, the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identified without strong assumptions on preferences across households. Our new results show that, though not point identified without these assumptions, strong bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained. We get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the col...
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作者：Magill, Michael; Quinzii, Martine; Rochet, Jean-Charles
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Zurich; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：There is a widely held view within the general public that large corporations should act in the interests of a broader group of agents than just their shareholders (the stakeholder view). This paper presents a framework where this idea can be justified. The point of departure is the observation that a large firm typically faces endogenous risks that may have a significant impact on the workers it employs and the consumers it serves. These risks generate externalities on these stakeholders whic...
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作者：Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper develops a specification test for instrument validity in the heterogeneous treatment effect model with a binary treatment and a discrete instrument. The strongest testable implication for instrument validity is given by the condition for nonnegativity of point-identifiable compliers' outcome densities. Our specification test infers this testable implication using a variance-weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. The test can be applied to both discrete and continuous outcome ca...
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作者：Baumeister, Christiane; Hamilton, James D.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper makes the following original contributions to the literature. (i) We develop a simpler analytical characterization and numerical algorithm for Bayesian inference in structural vector autoregressions (VARs) that can be used for models that are overidentified, just-identified, or underidentified. (ii) We analyze the asymptotic properties of Bayesian inference and show that in the underidentified case, the asymptotic posterior distribution of contemporaneous coefficients in an n-variab...
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Ray, Debraj; Yeltekin, Sevin
作者单位：Stanford University; New York University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self-control. In line with a distinguished psychological literature, we consider modes of self-control that involve the self-imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards. We study settings in which consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints. Our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self-control, trapping ...
